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How populists engage with media of various types, and are treated by journalistic media, are 
questions of international interest. In the United States, Donald Trump stands out for both his 
populism-inflected campaign style and his success at attracting media attention. This paper 
examines how interactions between candidate communications, social media, partisan media, 
and news media combined to shape attention to Trump, Clinton, Cruz and Sanders during the 
2015-2016 American presidential primary elections. We identify six major components of the 
American media system and measure candidates’ efforts to gain attention from them. Our results 
demonstrate that social media activity, in the form of retweets of candidate posts, provided a 
significant boost to news media coverage of Trump, but no such boost for other candidates. 
Further, Trump tweeted more at times when he had recently garnered less of a relative advantage 
in news attention, suggesting he strategically used Twitter to trigger coverage.  
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Trump, Twitter, and News Media Responsiveness: A Media Systems Approach 
 
The relationship between the growth of populism in Latin American, Europe and the 
United States, and the development of the digitized communication system is a topic of great 
interest to scholars of communication and politics (Mazzoleni, 2008). Amidst a lively research 
paradigm, scholars have examined populist rhetoric (Oliver & Rahn, 2016), uses of social media 
(Engesser, Ernst, Esser & Buchel, 2017), and treatment in the press (Bos, van der Brug & de 
Vreese, 2011; Schmuck, Matthes & Boomgaarden, 2016). We build on this work by examining 
how different components of the hybrid media system responded to the leading candidates of the 
2016 American presidential primary elections, which featured two candidates—Donald Trump 
and Bernie Sanders—noted for populist qualities. In this, we address a gap highlighted in a 
recent special issue on the topic of populist political communication (de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, 
Reinemann & Stanyer, 2018).  
Our specific focus is on how attention generated by Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Hillary 
Clinton and Bernie Sanders was amplified and spread among diverse sectors of the media 
ecology during the primaries in 2015-2016. Trump is an especially intriguing case, as a candidate 
who exhibited several populist predilections and received a disproportionate share of attention 
from news media (Patterson, 2016). Research investigating how this heightened attention 
developed has shown, for example, the range of attention-getting resources from which Trump 
benefited (Wells et al., 2016). Here, Sanders stands as a counterpoint, a candidate who displayed 
traits of left-wing populism, but did not receive the outsize attention Trump enjoyed, nor win his 
party’s nomination (Oliver & Rahn, 2016). 
We take a novel, media system-oriented approach to explore questions about how 
populists generate attention in a diversified and fragmented media ecology. First, we situate 
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Trump and Sanders in the context of each party’s nomination process, by also considering the 
mechanisms by which their principal rivals, Cruz and Clinton, attracted attention. Second, we 
disaggregate what is often referred to simply as the “media system” by typologizing six distinct 
clusters of media outlets in the United States, from left-wing to centrist, right-leaning and 
populist-inflected right-wing media outlets. This enables us to build a more refined picture of 
how “the media” responded to the candidates. Finally, we consider the social media behavior of 
the candidates and their supportive online publics, and how that behavior related to media 
attention.  
American populists? 
 The notion and nature of “populism” is a contested one even within the European sphere 
in which it is receiving the most thorough examination (Mudde, 2004). In some ways, applying 
the term in the United States is even more problematic. Unlike many European countries, which 
have political parties that can readily be identified as populist, the American two-party system 
largely circumscribes this possibility; Trump, of course, won as a Republican, and Sanders 
eschewed his independent label in the Senate to run as a Democrat. They thus had a complicated 
mix of insider and outsider traits. 
Yet even if we stay within the most-agreed upon aspects of populism, the two candidates 
exhibited a number of typical elements. Most of all, both were notable for their consistent attacks 
on elites (Mudde, 2004), though their depiction of who the elites were and what they were doing 
diverged widely. Trump’s version doubled-down on the anti-“cultural” elite that has been the 
target of Republican politicians and conservative media for decades (Peck, 2019): foremost, 
coastal liberals, the Washington DC establishment, and people associated with news media. In a 
move out of the playbook of right-wing populism, he rhetorically paired attacks on this elite with 
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ostracism of key groups he portrayed as threats—most of all, immigrants and people from the 
Middle East. In doing so, he explicitly called out the concept of an American “Heartland” 
(Engesser et al., 2017) and promised its renewal under his leadership (“Make America Great 
Again”). Trump thus fills out all three of the characteristics of Jagers and Walgrave’s notion 
(2007) of “thick” populism. Further stylistic notes characterized Trump’s campaigning, 
especially his regular violations of political norms, vernacular communicative style, and 
criticism of news media (de Vreese et al., 2018), all of which served to underwrite a Manichaen 
view of political legitimacy (Waisbord, 2017).  
Typically for a left-wing populist, Sanders’ anti-elitism was directed at economic elites 
and corporations, whom he characterized as standing in the way of average Americans fulfilling 
their needs in education, healthcare, employment and other domains (Oliver & Rahn, 2016). 
However, contra Trump, Sanders’ anti-elitism was not paired with either the demonization of 
any “horizontal” groups (Engesser et al., 2017) or a strongly evoked “Heartland”; his appeals for 
economic solidarity portrayed its benefits to a pluralistic, diverse society. In Jagers and 
Walgrave’s (2007) framework, Sanders might then be more on the “thinner” end of the populist 
scale, though his solidly crafted persona as a candidate standing up against enormous elite 
forces—and being outside the mainstream of the Democratic party—goes a bit beyond their 
purely “thin” formulation. Notably, Sanders’ appearances also lacked any of the norm violations 
or media attacks for which Trump became so well known. 
Populists and the press 
 Our examination of how Trump and his rivals fared at attracting attention in the hybrid 
media system can be situated within several bodies of literature: the treatment of populist actors 
by the press, the wider logics of the hybrid media system and attention economy, and specific 
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components of the American communication system. We take these in turn before proposing 
research questions.  
Waisbord (2018) sees an “elective affinity” between conditions of twenty-first century 
public communication and the resurgence of (especially right-wing) populist movements, parties, 
and politicians—and the “post-truth” communication they often embrace. The circumvention and 
manipulation of traditional, centralized and elite gatekeeping that characterized the Post-World 
War II media systems of the West “has ushered in new, multilayered forms of news sharing and 
engagement” (p. 6). Now joining traditional journalistic organizations are news commentary and 
information-aggregating outlets catering to all tastes and preferences—and depictions of social 
reality (van Aelst et al., 2017). Populism’s understanding of politics fits with these 
communicative conditions: accepting a priori the correctness of their view, communication 
becomes not a collective search for truth or attempt to establish deliberation or compromise, but 
a power-defining arena to be manipulated.  
 Attending to how this occurs in three communicative domains—news treatment of 
populists, online partisan media, and social media—will help us to illustrate the current 
conditions of populist political communication.  
Legacy news media and populists 
As Schmuck, Matthes and Boomgaarden (2017) point out, for many European populist 
parties (e.g., Austrian Freedom Party), attaining coverage in the mainstream press has been a 
central goal since well before social media. Mainstream coverage confers legitimacy on populists 
as relevant actors in public discussions and helps spread their message to new audiences 
(Mazzoleni, 2008). This has given rise to a complex relationship: populists have assiduously 
courted press attention, while simultaneously criticizing, and being critiqued by, the press 
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(Mudde, 2007). Several features of this relationship are worth noting. First, many Western news 
media exhibit features that can themselves be described as populist, in style if not in ideology 
(Esser et al., 2016): anti-elitism, a celebration of “the people” in opposition to larger institutional 
forces, routinized criticism of public officials, and heightened interest in public affairs scandals 
(Mazzoleni, 2008; Wettstein et al., 2018). There are clear echoes here of the reflexive and 
ritualized criticism of policy-makers of which the American and British presses have been 
accused (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Wayne & Murray, 2009). One result may be publics 
receptive to populist appeals owing to years of depictions of elite underperformance and 
malfeasance. 
Second, populists often gain leverage from coverage in the press even if the coverage is 
largely negative in tone. This has been demonstrated in multiple contexts, including Sweden and 
Swizerland: as Esser and colleagues (2016) note, “The positive effects of increased visibility 
appeared to have trumped the negative effect of the tone of the coverage” (p. 366). This seeming 
paradox appears to have several explanations. One is the predilection of most Western 
journalistic traditions for covering the novel, unusual, and conflictual, which populists have 
become expert at providing (Moffitt, 2016). Another is the increasing importance of attention in 
Western public spheres that have periodically become fixed around flamboyant populist leaders 
(Krämer, 2017). In combination with growing distrust of the press in some countries and anti-
elitist sentiment in many, enhanced attention to populist actors, who often respond to negative 
coverage with attacks on the press as agents of a corrupt status quo, can enhance their status with 
sizable audiences (Hahl, Kim & Zuckerman, 2018; Mazzoleni, 2008). 
Third, how commercial media logics lead news organizations to devote disproportionate 
attention to populist actors and populist narratives is an important area for investigation. Krämer 
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(2014) and Mudde (2007) argue that tabloids and a broader increased attentiveness to 
profitability have contributed to an increasingly populist style, and perhaps even attention 
devoted to populists, among European news media. Systematic empirical analyses comparing 
tabloids with quality news media (Akkerman, 2011; Hameleers, Bos & de Vreese, 2016) have 
been more equivocal; the larger question of how financial imperatives are shaping news 
treatment of populists is far from answered. In the case of Trump there are significant questions 
about the role that heightened attention to audience metrics played in driving coverage of him 
(Pickard, 2017).  
Partisan media support 
 Further, the “news media” that make up the contemporary media system is no monolithic 
entity; the journalistic outlets that were once the core of Western polities are now joined by 
highly partisan ones with a variety of forms of backing and goals, including profit-seeking 
efforts to reach niche polarized audiences, political hobby-horses, and combinations of the two. 
Such media support, in partnership with heavy social media activity, interaction and 
amplification, can be vital to structuring populist actors and parties (Engesser et al., 2017; 
Schmuck, Matthes & Boomgaarden, 2017).  
 Given the potential importance of partisan, populist media, there is too little research yet 
published on the topic. In the United States, whose generation of such outlets is especially 
advanced, the unparalleled example of 2016 was Breitbart, which rose from relative obscurity to 
challenge Fox News as the standard-bearer of conservative opinion (Faris et al., 2017). 
Breitbart’s coverage preceding the 2016 election was unabashedly populist, routinely criticizing 
elites (including Democrats and establishment Republicans) and many media, including Fox 
News, which it portrayed as corrupted by Republican elites and insufficiently supportive of 
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Trump. With Breitbart, self-described populist Steve Bannon had a vehicle to wage cultural war. 
Populists and social media 
It should not be surprising that political actors who until recent years were marginal 
players in legislative bodies and public debates would embrace opportunities to circumvent the 
constraints and editorial control of journalistic media (Groshek & Engelbert, 2012). As Engesser 
and colleagues (2017), among others, have shown, the prolific and often effective use of social 
media by populist actors is a common finding across national contexts. Aside from being able to 
sidestep journalistic gatekeepers (Engesser, Fawzi & Larsson, 2017), interactivity on social 
media and an often-combative discursive style lend themselves to on-brand populist messaging 
(Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018). All of these were on frequent display in Trump’s own Twitter 
use (Pelled, Lukito, Boehm, Yang, & Shah, 2018). 
In addition to a direct channel of promotion for populist leaders, social media have 
proven to be fertile ground for the development of communities of populist, ethno-nationalist, 
and anti-establishment sentiment (Kemmers, van der Waal & Aupers, 2015; Krämer, 2017). 
These dynamics were prominent in 2016 election, when trolls, gamers and Alt Right supporters 
on 4Chan and Reddit supplied memes and other content for Trump supporters in more 
mainstream sites such as Twitter (Musgrave, 2017). In a hybrid media system, this makes the 
tight connection between news and social media into a battleground for control of ideas, symbols  
and representations of public sentiment that is well—perhaps best—understood by political 
actors from the populist right (the “Alt Right” in the U.S.; Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Zhang, 
Wells, Wang & Rohe, 2017).  
Nearly as intriguing as the success of the trans-national political right in developing 
organs of communication, and translating networked movements into political power (Stier, 
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Posch, Bleier & Strohmeier, 2017), is the failure on the left to do so. A mere few years ago, 
networked social movements around the globe (such as Occupy Wall Street and Los Indignados) 
were injecting left-leaning, quasi-populist sentiments like inequality into public discourse. But 
unlike its conservative and often nationalist counterparts, the left has largely failed to convert 
movement energy into institutional power (Bennett, Segerbers & Knüpfer, 2017). Bennett and 
colleagues (2017) connect this divide in part to “the popular meta-ideology of diversity and 
inclusiveness and demands for direct or deliberative democracy” on the left, in contrast to desires 
for clearer and more hierarchically-rendered moral, organizational and, increasingly, 
national/ethnic boundaries on the right.  
One important area for investigation is how these differences in political style translate 
into the realm of the social-broadcast media nexus: one wonders if the blunt politics of right-
wing populists is conveyed much more effectively to receptive audiences over Twitter and bite-
sized headlines than the intricate compromises left-wing populists have to embody. 
System-Thinking in Communication Research  
The prior discussion outlines three parts of a media ecology that populist communicators 
enter and circulate. Though useful analytically to separate them, partisan outlets and social media 
influence and compete with one another. Two concepts that aid us in conceptualizing these 
interactions are the hybrid media system and the attention economy.  
The hybrid media system 
Chadwick (2017) notes that systems are made of relationships between components, and 
that the hybrid media system includes traditional media actors such as journalists and news 
organizations, those seeking to shape news coverage, such as politicians and social movements, 
and those using digital technologies to insert themselves into communications to provide 
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political commentary and partisan viewpoints. Today, older actors and logics hybridize with new 
ones (see also Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011), and new categories are emerging in response to 
evolving patterns and opportunities.  
 Systems also tend to have regulating mechanisms that keep them in relative stasis, as well 
as a mix of “inherent complexity, instability, and messiness” (Chadwick, 2017, p. 16). This 
volatility is a product of systemic change, as well as the fact that in many systems—including 
media systems—elements are both in strident competition and heavily dependent on one another. 
This quality is highlighted by the tempestuous relationship between news organizations and the 
social media platforms on which much of their content is shared.  
The attention economy 
Attention is increasingly recognized an essential resource for individuals and groups 
wishing to exercise political or social influence in many contexts: governmental policymaking, 
news agenda setting, and social movement organizing (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Conway, 
Kenski & Wang, 2015; Freelon, McIlwain & Clark, 2016; Walgrave, Boydstun, Vliegenthart & 
Hardy, 2017). And if the hybrid media system framework describes the constituent elements of 
the media system and their interactions, theories of the attention economy focus on attention as a 
primary currency of that system—that is, the substance often being exchanged (Goldhaber, 1997; 
Webster, 2014). 
Notably, and especially interesting in the context of news media coverage of norm-
breaking populists, the attention economy perspective has tended to focus on quantity of 
attention, rather than its quality. This makes for a parsimonious approach, and also reflects a 
sense that any attention may be positive attention—in line with the quote above from Esser et al. 
(2016). Indeed, the ability to generate attention is critical in political campaigns, particularly for 
11 
 
unconventional candidates and in crowded fields, where the news media’s attention is divided 
(Canon, 1990; Shah et al., 1999).  
This raises the stakes of editorial decisions about whom to cover, with past practice 
leading journalists to cover candidates in line with their incumbency, standing in the polls, 
success at raising campaign funds, and candidates’ gender (Kahn, 1994). Moreover, the 
American press’ commitment to balance in political reporting often leads to equalization of 
coverage among leading contenders. In this sense, the disproportionate news coverage of Donald 
Trump in 2015 and 2016 constituted a deviation from the norm (Patterson, 2016).  
We ask how this came to be, focusing on how Trump and his rivals gained attentional 
advantage within the media system. Our analyses below take into account the many techniques—
participation in debates, staged events, media appearances and social media activity—on which 
candidates draw to get and maintain attention. 
The American Political-Media System 
 The preceding discussions of populists’ interactions with various media forms, the hybrid 
media system and the attention economy can be integrated to build our understanding of the 
contemporary U.S. media landscape. Over a couple of decades, that landscape has seen 
fragmentation and proliferation: especially notable is the growth in partisan news outlets, 
beginning with the development of right-wing talk radio in the 1980s, conservative cable news 
like Fox News in the 1990s, and a rash of extreme online outlets in the early 2000s, of which the 
avowedly populist Breitbart (2010) and conspiracy-oriented InfoWars (a spin-off of Alex Jones’ 
talk radio show) are among the most prominent (Berry & Sobieraj, 2015; Ladd, 2015). 
On the left, a handful of prominent blogs (e.g., Daily Kos) and online-only news 
organizations (e.g., Huffington Post) offer something of a counterweight to the right-wing; 
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MSNBC also took a more liberal editorial position in the 2000s, mimicking larger trends of 
polarization among elites and publics. However, as Faris and colleagues (2017) point out, these 
outlets remain closely tied to mainstream core journalistic institutions in ways the far-right 
newcomers do not.  
 The political economy of the American digital communication system is also highly 
significant, as it has challenged the advertising revenue models of profit-oriented journalism 
(Schlesinger & Doyle, 2015). With social media platforms becoming the primary online interface 
for millions of users, actors of all types are recalibrating their activities to optimize the 
distribution of their stories in online domains, capitalizing on the ad revenue each click 
generates—classic attentional economics (Karpf, 2016). 
 As Karpf (2016) notes, this click-driven content production logic now permeates all 
forms of digital media production, including traditional news. The most significant recent 
entrants into newsrooms are not any human agent, but metrics: the ability to gauge what types of 
content are succeeding, on the homepage and in the contested domain of social media (Lecheler 
and Kruikemeier, 2016; Parmelee, 2014).  
 As the measurement of audience metrics becomes a crucial link between social media 
publics and media outlets developing and delivering content (Schlesinger & Doyle, 2015), social 
media become a live barometer of what topics are percolating in the public mind, or at least 
among the influential people who actively share and consume information via social media. 
Journalists and editors are often desperate to find “hooks” to attract audiences and deliver 
pageviews and clicks to advertisers. The result is a constant monitoring, via countless social 
media tracking services, of both journalistic products and the social media streams they are 
swept into (McGregor & Molyneux, 2018). 
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Attention Cycles of the 2016 Election 
These dynamics were on prominent display in the 2016 American presidential election. 
Though he ultimately won the nomination of a major political party, Trump’s primary campaign 
began as something akin to a European fringe party. Equipped with instincts for drawing and 
sustaining audiences’ attention—honed over decades spent courting public attention, and more 
recent forays into speaking at massive rallies (Oliver & Rahn, 2016)—Trump’s campaign played 
perfectly to the communicative environment described, offering regular doses of sensationalism, 
novelty and outrageous statements across multiple media. For his part, Sanders ran an upstart 
insurgency against Clinton and the bulk of the Democratic establishment. Building on the 
participatory ethos of Obama’s run eight years before, Sanders ran hard against elites of many 
kinds—in the nation and in the Democratic party. 
It was to Trump that the wider media ecology responded: Trump received more attention 
from journalists than any opponent, even chief rivals, often by a factor of two or three. During 
the primary, “there was not a single week when Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, or John Kasich topped 
Trump’s level of coverage” (Patterson, 2016). This massive volume of “earned” coverage 
allowed Trump to spend much less than opponents on advertising, supporting his effort to win 
the primary and general elections.  One election post-mortem estimated that Trump garnered 
$4.96 billion in free coverage compared to Clinton’s $3.24 billion, outpacing her in every 
medium (Harris, 2016). Media attention to Sanders trailed substantially, especially early in the 
primaries, before his campaign was recognized as a genuine threat to Clinton. 
Research Questions 
We are interested in understanding how different components of the American media 
system allocated their attention among the four leading candidates during the primaries. Taking 
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our cue from the attention economy framework (Webster, 2014), our focus here is not on how 
Trump, Cruz, Clinton, or Sanders were covered, but how they were able to muster attention. In 
particular, we aim to understand how two candidates delivering messages with discernable 
populist features (Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017) generated attention 
from different parts of a polarized media environment, and whether those processes differed 
from one another and from the other candidates. 
We can thus articulate three research questions that center on the responsiveness of the 
media system to the four candidates: 
RQ1: How did sectors of the media system differ in the attention they provided to the 
candidates? 
RQ2: Were different sectors of the media system responsive to different attention-
attracting techniques?  
RQ3: How did the candidates differ in the mechanisms by which they were able to attract 
media attention? 
In this, we build on previous research by Wells et al. (2016). That study assessed the 
factors leading to coverage of Trump among several mainstream news media outlets. We 
improve on that work by (1) considering attention to multiple leading candidates of the 2016 
primaries; (2) disaggregating the media system to investigate the behavior of different media 
types; and (3) including measures of each candidate’s polling standing at each point in the 
campaign, to better control for overall popularity.  
Method 
To model patterns of attention to Trump, Clinton, Cruz and Sanders, we constructed a 




• Counts of news stories about Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Hillary Clinton and Bernie 
Sanders, from key news outlets, which served as our dependent variables; 
• An event timeline that took account of: debates, staged events, and media appearances—
both planned and impromptu—for each candidate; 
• Counts of candidates' tweets; 
• Counts of retweets of the candidates’ tweets; and 
• The candidates’ nation-wide popularity as measured by aggregated opinion polls 
 
Each variable was recorded for each day starting on June 16, 2015—the day Donald 
Trump announced his candidacy, and thus the first date at which all four candidates were in the 
race—and ended May 4, 2016—the day John Kasich dropped out of the race, handing the 
Republican nomination to Trump. 
News stories 
We created daily counts of articles about each of the four candidates—Donald Trump, 
Ted Cruz, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders—defined as mentioning the given candidate at 
least twice in a story. Our reasoning was that a single mention of a candidate may occur in 
passing in an article; but a candidate mentioned twice was likely receiving more attention.1 We 
collected articles from MediaCloud (https://mediacloud.org/), a platform storing word 
occurrence frequencies of articles from tens of thousands of news outlets. 
 To construct our sampling frame, we aimed to first, characterize outlets by partisanship 
and second, contrast ‘legacy’ outlets to those centered in social media (cf. Guo & Vargo, 2018). 
 
1 Figure A1 in the appendix graphically displays the trend of news media coverage across the campaign. The trends 
are highly correspondent with the events of the campaign, offering at least face validity to this approach. 
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Faris et al. (2017) present data making it possible to do both. First, their study gauged the 
partisanship of news media audiences based on their social media behavior. Second, they 
quantified the extent to which outlets’ articles were shared through social media, and the quantity 
of inlinks each outlet attracted from other news outlets. We used these two linking scores to 
create a ratio of each outlets’ relative attention from within social media (specifically Facebook 
and Twitter) as opposed to other media outlets linking to them on the web. We conceptualized 
this measure as a gauge of integration with the traditional versus the social media ecosystem: i.e., 
the more the references to an outlet were coming from social media and not traditional media, 
the more we suspected it to be reliant on social media-directed attention. The more an outlet 
received links from traditional media, the more we suspected it was part of a traditional, legacy 
news ecology. Finally, we selected 24 major media outlets based on (a) their prominence in the 
American political media system; (b) their dispersion across the two dimensions just described 
(see Figure 1); and (c) the completeness of data available on their daily coverage. In analyses 
below, daily measures of coverage within each category are constructed by averaging the daily 
counts of that category’s constituent outlets, as displayed in Figure 1. 
<Figure 1 about here> 
Event Data 
We used multiple timelines from news organizations and candidate-affiliated webpages 
to develop a timeline of events for each of the four candidates. This was important to account for 
the conventional “information subsidies” campaigns produce to attract press coverage (Gandy, 
1982). These included timelines from the Washington Examiner, Reuters, CNN, Newsday, NPR, 
USA Today, People magazine and a Trump support group. To ensure the significance of all 
events mentioned, each event was also validated by checking other news outlets; just over twenty 
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events were removed because they appeared on only one timeline timelines or outlets were 
inconsistent about the dates of the events. The events we identified were grouped into four 
categories: 
1. Planned Public Events. These included campaign rallies, town hall meetings and other 
coordinated interactions with the public. 
2. Planned Media Events. These events included organized media appearances such as press 
conferences and scheduled interviews. 
3. Unplanned Media Events. Based on Trump's common practice of calling in to radio and 
television shows, we accounted for unplanned media appearances by the candidates. 
4. Republican/Democratic primary debates. 
 
Twitter data 
The Twitter accounts used in this study are: Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Hillary 
Clinton (@HillaryClinton), Ted Cruz (@SenTedCruz, @tedcruz), and Bernie Sanders 
(@BernieSanders, @SenSanders). Note that whereas Trump and Clinton used only one account 
each, Sanders and Cruz each used two accounts during the campaign; we tracked both and 
combined them in measurement. 
 We retrieved all tweets from the four candidates’ accounts from the data provider 
Crimson Hexagon. That is, we requested all tweets posted by the six relevant accounts during 
our sample period. The data were returned to us and stored as CSV files containing one tweet per 
row. Metadata stored included time of posting the tweet and many other features. 
We retrieved retweets of candidates’ tweets from an archive of tweets collected through 
the Twitter Streaming API, which Twitter describes as an approximately 1% random sample of 
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global tweets. There has been some discussion about the randomness of tweets selected for 
Twitter’s “garden hose” sample (e.g., Morstatter, Pfeffer, Liu & Carley, 2013), so we conducted 
cross-validations of our data. First, we compared the series of daily retweet counts for Trump to 
a comparable series of counts from Crimson Hexagon and found a r = .99 correspondence, and 
only slightly lower correspondences for the other candidates. Second, we compared 1% 
Streaming API data and purchased 100% “Firehose” data during the first and third presidential 
debates of 2016, this time comparing counts of tweets mentioning “Trump” and “Clinton” within 
specified time intervals. Even at granularities as small as 10-second intervals, the correspondence 
in counts is high (r ~ .95), and at 45-second intervals it is nearly perfect (r ~.99), suggesting that 
at least for the types of aggregate measures we are using (daily counts of retweets), the 1% 
sample approximates Twitter as a whole extremely closely. 
To count retweets, we identified retweets of tweets of each of the six handles of interest, 
and generated a daily count of the number of retweets received by each candidate, each day. (For 
candidates with two accounts, retweets from both accounts were added together.) On 28 of the 
days in the series, our archive received no data from Twitter. Counts of retweets on these days 
were replaced by linear imputation in cases of two or fewer missing days; for two longer 
stretches, we used a vector autoregressive model of each candidates’ retweet values to forecast 
the missing values. As a robustness check, we also tested the models with missing days removed 
and found nearly identical results. 
Public opinion data 
We collected the HuffingtonPost/Pollster poll average for each candidate, on each day of 
our time period (for Trump & Cruz: https://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/2016-national-
gop-primary; for Clinton & Sanders: https://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/2016-national-
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democratic-primary). Where a candidate’s poll standing on a given day was missing because of 
lack of polls that day, we performed linear imputation using existing data points. 
Results 
We modeled the coverage of Trump relative to Cruz and Clinton relative to Sanders by 
each category of media organization with time-series regression models using Prais-Winsten 
estimation. To focus our analysis on the extent to which each gained coverage exceeding that of 
their main primary opponent, we calculated net advantage variables by subtracting each 
candidate’s coverage count in each media category from their opposing candidate’s coverage 
count. This enables us to control for baseline levels of attention to each primary campaign. We 
did this for all major events, social media posts and retweets, and public opinion standing. For 
example, we calculated Trump net advantage in public opinion polls by calculating Trump’s poll 
rating - Cruz’s poll rating on each day of the sample.  
In seeking to explain news media attention to candidates, we faced the problem that we 
do not well know how long it is likely to take for a given impulse—the attention-generating 
mechanism—to have its effect, in this case in news media attention. Given the relatively open-
ended nature of knowledge on the topic at present, we specified our models to test three 
possibilities of “lag” in the dependent variable. First, we specified “no lag” models that included 
measures of all variables on the same day. This gives an indication of daily co-occurrence of the 
variables. Second, we specified “one-day lag” models in which independent variables predicted 
dependent variables the following day. This gives us some leverage over the direction in which 
effects are flowing. Third, we specified “two-day lag” models in which dependent variables were 
projected two days into the future. We added this specification out of suspicion that a “signal” 




We thus specified two sets of three models: Net Trump-Cruz models with three sets of 
lags, and Net Clinton-Sanders models with three sets of lags. In what follows, we begin by 
presenting the full models with no lags; then, for reasons of space, we present a summary model 
of our variable of greatest interest: retweets of the candidates. (All full models are available in 
the appendix.) 
Table 1 presents a no lag time series regression with Prais-Winsten estimation exploring 
factors associated with Net Trump media attention (that is, Trump’s media coverage – Cruz’s 
media coverage) across the six categories of news outlets.  
<Table 1 about here> 
The most consistent pattern across the models is that a higher retweet volume of Trump 
relative to Cruz is associated with greater relative news coverage of him. The next most 
consistently performing variable is days with Republican debates, which consistently generated 
greater news attention to Trump (statistically significant for four types of media outlet, and close 
in another). The relative poll standing of the candidates also played a role, reflecting that as 
Trump or Cruz gained in the polls, that candidate’s coverage also grew (statistically significant 
in two tests, and marginally significant in three more). Interestingly, statistically significant 
effects for events are less consistent, though Trump did seem to see gains in Far Right, Left 
Media and possibly Center Right media on days with public events. Nonetheless, there is little 
evidence that either candidate systematically gained attention advantage from hosting public and 
media events or making unscheduled appearances. 
Turning to the models for Clinton-Sanders, Table 2 shows a fairly consistent pattern 
associating candidates’ tweets with news coverage—in Far Right, Right Wing, Mainstream and 
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Left Wing news outlets. Clinton and/or Sanders tweeting more appears to occur on days with 
greater news media coverage, though we can say little about what direction causality runs in this 
case, or if both are in response to a third factor. Otherwise, there is a paucity of statistically 
significant effects across nearly all hypothesized attention-generating variables. Especially, note 
the lack of correlation between the retweet factor and coverage, indicating that neither Clinton 
nor Sanders received boosts in coverage from moments of high retweeting of messages. And 
campaign event variables are similarly sparse and inconsistent.  
<Table 2 about here> 
 Whereas the concurrent (no lag) models give an impression of the correspondence 
between key variables and media attention outcomes, to gain an impression of influence—of one 
thing causing, or at least systematically preceding another—we turn to models with lags, which 
allow us to examine temporal order by testing the impact of a given variable on another at a later 
time. Full models may be found in the appendix; here we focus on the variable with the most 
consistent findings across the three lag types: net retweets of Trump and Cruz. Table 3 displays 
coefficients and standard errors for net retweets of Trump and Cruz, and those of Clinton and 
Sanders, for each of the three lag specifications, for ease of interpretation. The Trump-Cruz 
models show high correspondence between retweets and news media coverage in the no-lag 
models (four significant tests, one marginal); for one-day lag models the effects are less robust 
(three marginal tests); and at two-day lags the models are very robust (five significant tests, one 
marginal). This is powerful evidence that retweets played a role in spurring news media attention 
to the candidates—and in this case, we primarily mean to Trump. Notably, when we use a 
slightly different model specification, a lagged dependent model rather than Prais-Winsten, one-
day lagged results for the retweet variable are robust across all media types (see appendix). Our 
22 
 
conclusion is that retweet activity of Trump is driving a rise in news media mentions that endures 
for at least two days. (Also see appendix for Trump-only models which make clear that it was 
attention to him, not to Cruz, that drives the overall findings.) 
The Clinton-Sanders models, by contrast, show very weak results (four marginal tests in 
all). It is also worth noting that the correlation between candidates’ own tweets in the no lag 
models is nowhere replicated in the lag models for Clinton-Sanders. 
<Table 3 about here> 
Given the significance of retweets as an attention-generating mechanism for Trump, it is 
worth considering how these played out over the course of the primaries. Figure 2 displays this 
in terms of the retweets per week of each of the four candidates. There, Trump’s ability to 
generate social media buzz is clearly in a different league than Cruz’s, throughout the series. But 
what is more notable is that Sanders’ retweets largely kept pace with Trump’s. This is quite 
striking in light of our earlier finding concerning the news media attention Trump gained from 
social media; if the same effect had been present for Sanders, a quite different pattern of media 
attention may have resulted on the Democratic side. Thus, in comparison to Sanders, Trump’s 
social media message was not amplified more in social media, but in the transition from social to 
news media. This likely underscores the uniqueness of Trump’s often abrasive and sensationalist 
social media behavior, and the responsiveness of multiple types of news media to those features 
(Pelled et al., 2018). Sanders was doing something else, which was resonating with social media 
publics, but not moving from them into the broader media ecology—an intriguing echo of 
Bennett and colleagues’ (2017) findings about the challenges facing left-leaning movements, and 
potentially the natural advantage enjoyed by outspoken right-wing populists. 
<Figure 2 about here> 
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Given the importance of Trump’s retweets relative to each of the other candidates, and 
the speculation of Wells and colleagues (2016) that he may have responded to waning coverage 
with increased Twitter activity, we estimate a final set of models using the predicted values of 
media coverage recovered from the previous models to predict Trump’s relative twitter activity. 
We estimate a simple bivariate model, although more fully saturated models yield very similar 
results.2  Table 4 shows these results, using OLS regression models to relate subsequent Twitter 
posting by Trump relative to Cruz to Trump’s news coverage advantage on the previous day. 
These models suggest Trump tends to tweet more when he has recently garnered less relative 
attention in news coverage from Center Right, Mainstream, Left Wing, and Far Left outlets.   
<Table 4 about here> 
Discussion 
Though the 2016 American primaries were limited to ‘only’ two candidates exhibiting 
populist traits, our results contribute to the growing body of literature on populists’ presence in 
news media. Further, ours is one of few analyses to compare the treatment of populists by very 
different sectors of the media system, and to link social media activity to that treatment.  
And our results reveal surprising uniformity at how outlets spanning the political-media 
landscape allocated attention to the major candidates (see Figure 3). Clinton and Sanders were 
somewhat differentially covered—with right-of-center, right-wing, and far-right outlets largely 
ignoring Sanders; but outlets of all varieties provided disproportionate coverage to Trump over 
Cruz from the very beginning of the campaign. Thus, whereas scholars such as Waisbord (2018) 
emphasize the fragmentation of the media system as an important condition of 21st-century 
populist, we demonstrate marked similarity in the responses of different types of media to 
 
2 We estimate these models with OLS using a lagged endogenous variable. We bootstrap the standard errors on our 
coefficient of interest. 
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Trump, leading us to place greater weight on the political economy of attention as a critical 
component of the populist era; we discuss this in greater detail below. 
<Figure 3 about here> 
There was also surprising similarity in the factors that drove Trump’s attention 
advantage, with the volume of his retweets playing an important role for virtually all media 
types. This was not a partisan phenomenon, nor one restricted to “clickbait” media: the core 
mainstream press and left-leaning serious journalism (Mother Jones, New Yorker) outlets were 
as responsive to the social media amplification of Trump’s posts as were far-right (Breitbart) and 
highly social media-oriented outlets (HuffingtonPost). This finding emphasizes both the hybrid 
nature of the media environment, and the significance of social media as an engine with the 
potential to push attention to populists into every corner of the mediasphere. 
At least for some populists: what also stood out was that this mechanism for attracting 
attention was available only to Trump. Sanders, Trump’s left-wing populist foil, received 
comparable social media support, but a fraction of the media attention. One suspects that the 
content of Trump’s tweets, often saturated with attacks on his opponents, establishment elites, 
and populist targets like immigrants and Muslims, contributed to the volume of his posts getting 
retweeted, and provided irresistible fodder for news outlets and their readers in ways that 
Sanders’ more policy- and campaign-oriented tweets did not. The little-heralded popularity of 
Sanders’ social media presence certainly merits greater study as an artifact of an American 
campaign inflected by left-wing populism. 
Trump’s dominance over Cruz among left-wing outlets further suggests Trump may have 
gained from vociferously critical coverage from ideological enemies (Esser et al., 2016), a 
finding that calls for greater attention to the capacities of right- and left-wing populists to 
25 
 
provoke spectacles the news media want to cover, and the importance of out-party attacks in 
highly reactive political moments. At least within American political system, the outrage Trump 
drew on in his frequent norm violations may be much less available to candidates on the left 
(Kimmel, 2017). Another possibility is that amplification engines on the right were simply more 
effective at driving Trump’s presence into the news media (Phillips, 2018). Further attention to 
dynamics within and between news media should attempt to disentangle this possibility. 
The political economy of the attention economy 
The channel from social media activity to news media attention leads us to ask about the 
growing role of metrics and audience measurement in the attention economy (Boydstun & van 
Aelst, 2018; Webster, 2014). Especially as Trump’s Twitter behavior became a central feature of 
his persona, it appears that news media became attuned to buzz about him in social media 
(McGregor & Molyneux, 2018). In this, our findings contribute to a growing body of evidence 
concerning the workings of news judgment in a political economy defined by attracting 
audiences’ attention (Karpf, 2016; Webster, 2014), and lend support to the contention that 
profitability incentives among advertiser-dependent media can play a role in heightening 
attention to populists (Mudde, 2007). 
Rapid change in digital media newsrooms 
Other aspects of a changing political information system must be recognized as well: 
Trump’s unpredictability, his resistance to negative coverage, and pitch-perfect sense of 
timing—the latter especially supported by our finding of Trump’s responsiveness to waning 
news media interest—“caught off guard” (Boydstun & Van Aelst, 2018) newsrooms struggling 
to adapt to low and deeply polarized assessments of news media legitimacy (Mitchell et al., 
2014), the pace of social media-enabled campaigns, and the lack of public censure of norm-
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shattering politicians.  
Most of all, the changes to the digital newsroom and its political context has not come 
with unlimited additional resources or time. The attention and production of journalists, editors, 
pundits and producers are finite, especially within the context of a single news organization 
(Drew & Wilhout, 1976; McDonald & Lawrence, 2004; Benoit, Stein, & Hansen, 2005; 
Williams, Harte & Turner, 2015), even as journalists in the contemporary media environment are 
required to produce a range of digital products in nearly real time (Anderson, 2013; Revers, 
2014). While others have noted that Twitter changed the “boys on the bus” style reporting that 
characterized presidential news coverage in the 20th Century (Hamby, 2013), there is clearly 
need for more research into how the news hole in a digital attention economy is allocated. 
Clearly, our study is unable to predict to what degree these results will be replicated with 
future, non-Trump American populists. Nonetheless, this essay represents the study of a 
significant proportion of American candidates who could properly be called populists on the 
national stage. As such, we are able to say something about how populism is being received by 
American news media: so far, its right-wing, outspoken, attention-seeking and inciting variety is 
covered heavily and closely followed on social media. Its left-wing version, much less so. Future 
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Table 1: Concurrent (no lag) time series regression models with Prais-Winsten estimation predicting net Trump advantage in news coverage in six 
categories of media. 
 
 Far Right Right Media Center Right Mainstream Left Media Left click 
Trump-Cruz Tweets -0.012 -0.013 -0.038** -0.066 -0.023** -0.024 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.039) (0.006) (0.015) 
Trump-Cruz RT 0.001# 0.002* 0.002* 0.009* 0.001* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Trump-Cruz Poll Average 0.174** 0.169# 0.127# 0.448* 0.065 0.223# 
 (0.055) (0.092) (0.077) (0.209) (0.054) (0.125) 
Trump-Cruz Stage Pub 0.340* -0.114 0.316# 0.783 0.263* -0.277 
 (0.162) (0.196) (0.190) (0.882) (0.124) (0.298) 
Trump-Cruz Stage Med 0.405* 0.174 0.334# 0.367 -0.012 0.040 
 (0.161) (0.197) (0.190) (0.865) (0.124) (0.299) 
Trump-Cruz Unplanned 0.660** 0.039 0.134 0.006 0.203 0.082 
 (0.199) (0.242) (0.234) (1.076) (0.153) (0.368) 
Republican Debate 2.389** 3.800** 2.132** 6.809# 1.661** 0.064 
 (0.677) (0.823) (0.795) (3.672) (0.518) (1.250) 
Constant 1.042 1.408 0.086 3.934 1.519 3.287 
 (1.071) (1.795) (1.491) (4.055) (1.049) (2.434) 
       
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R-squared 0.127 0.084 0.092 0.058 0.084 0.023 





Table 2. Concurrent (no lag) time series regression models with Prais-Winsten estimation predicting net Clinton advantage in news coverage in six 
categories of media. 
 
 Far Right Right Wing Center Right Mainstream Left Wing Far Left 
       
Clinton-Sanders Tweets 0.037** 0.033** 0.014 0.095** 0.013** 0.019 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.027) (0.004) (0.016) 
Clinton-Sanders RT -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Clinton-Sanders Poll Average -0.018 0.000 -0.031# 0.064 0.006 0.018 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.052) (0.008) (0.025) 
Clinton-Sanders Stage Pub 0.041 0.113 0.099 0.149 0.047 0.273# 
 (0.110) (0.120) (0.086) (0.273) (0.045) (0.158) 
Clinton-Sanders Stage Med 0.222 0.168 0.250 -0.002 -0.028 0.012 
 (0.203) (0.220) (0.157) (0.501) (0.083) (0.292) 
Clinton-Sanders Unplanned 0.525 0.722 0.243 1.172 -0.261 -1.429 
 (2.057) (2.218) (1.579) (5.038) (0.836) (2.956) 
Democratic Debate -1.480* -0.986 -0.122 -0.920 -0.353 -1.407 
 (0.740) (0.792) (0.562) (1.796) (0.298) (1.062) 
Constant 3.511** 3.717** 2.930** 8.117** 0.666** 2.199** 
 (0.525) (0.633) (0.489) (1.519) (0.246) (0.770) 
       
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R-squared 0.054 0.038 0.035 0.060 0.040 0.038 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3. Summary table displaying coefficients and standard errors of Net retweet variables. Coefficients and standard errors are extracted from 
fully specified models, which can be found in the appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Far Right Right media Center-right Mainstream Left media Left-clickbait 
       
Trump-Cruz RT (no lag) .001# .002* .002* .009* .001* -.001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.001) (.002) 
Trump-Cruz RT (1-day lag) .002# .001 .001 .007# -.000 .003# 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.001) (.001) 
Trump-Cruz RT (2-day lag) .002# .002* .004** .010** .003** .004** 
 (.001) (.001) .001 (.004) (.001) (.001) 
       
Clinton-Sanders (no lag) -.001 -.001 -.002 -.000 -.001 .001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.000) (.001) 
Clinton-Sanders (1-day lag) .002* -.000 -.001# -.002 -.000 .003# 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.000) (.001) 
Clinton-Sanders (2-day lag) -.000 .001 .001 .004# .000 .001 
 (.001) (.001) .001 (.002) (.000) (.001) 
       
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
       



















       
Trump-Cruz Tweets 0.354** 0.347** 0.206** 0.312** 0.194** 0.444** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.064) (0.055) (0.064) (0.056) 
Far Right -3.999**      
 (0.941      
Right Wing  -4.221**     
  (1.073)     
Center Right   -5.097**    
   (1.194)    
Mainstream    -1.404**   
    (0.375)   
Left Wing     -8.889**  
     (2.001)  
Far Left      -0.376 
      (0.893) 
Constant 17.943** 19.897** 14.532** 18.791** 26.500** -0.180 
 (4.028) (4.140) (3.187) (4.216) (4.986) (6.426) 
       
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R-squared 0.272 0.279 0.281 0.271 0.288 0.208 








Figure 1: Categorization of 24 American media outlets. Quantitative placements based on data from Faris et al. (2017) 
 
 






Figure 2. Retweets of each candidate per week (1% sample), April 1, 2015-May 4, 2016. Black = 
Trump, Red = Cruz, Blue = Clinton, Green = Sanders. Blank spots in the series denote data 






Figure 3. Articles devoted to each candidate per week, by sector of the media system. Here, the range of dates is April 1, 2015 – 
December 1, 2016, to allow for comparison across primary and general election season. Black = Trump, Red = Cruz, Blue = Clinton, 
Green = Sanders. 
 
